North Korea: The End of Strategic Seclusion?
Abstract
Since the early 1990s, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has been quite static and stable in its own way despite periodic mini-crises. A lonely but unbroken North Korea stands up against the South Korean-U.S. alliance, playing diplomatic overtures in between crises and skillfully using contradictions between other actors in Northeast Asia. However, the balance of power on the peninsula and the international system as a whole has changed enough to date to transform the mode of confrontation between the two Koreas. Although North Korea has nuclear weapons, the military balance on and around the peninsula is not developing to Pyongyang’s advantage. This puts North Korea’s security at risk, especially due to the unpredictability of Seoul’s future policy. In terms of Kenneth Waltz’s structural realism, North Korea’s ability to balance the mounting strategic risks internally by mobilizing its own resources is extremely limited. This leaves the option of external balancing through alliance with strong military powers. The theory of structural realism remains relevant and helps to better understand the ongoing rapprochement between Pyongyang and Moscow.